Human Rights Watch's designation of Russia as an "undesirable" foreign organization, released by the Justice Department on November 28, is yet another manifestation of the repressive nature of the Kremlin regime, Human Rights Watch said today. This measure means a ban on the organization’s activities in Russia. “For more than three decades, Human Rights Watch's work on post-Soviet Russia has pressured Russian authorities to respect human rights and freedoms,” said Philippe Bolopion, executive director of Human Rights Watch. “Our work has not changed, but something else has changed: the rapid adoption of dictatorial practices by the authorities, a sharp increase in repression within the country and the scale of war crimes committed by the Russian military in Ukraine.” As follows from the Ministry of Justice’s updated register of “undesirable” organizations, the Prosecutor General’s Office decided to ban the activities of Human Rights Watch on November 10. The grounds for recognizing an organization as “undesirable” are unknown. In 2022, six weeks after Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian authorities deregistered the Moscow office of Human Rights Watch, which had operated in Russia since 1992. The bureau was forced to close, but our work continued. Human Rights Watch began working on Russian issues back in Soviet times, in 1978.

September 2025 recorded an increase in inspections and administration of NPOs in the region: audits, registration and reporting requirements intensified in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The causes are widespread concern among states about “foreign interference,” but the effect is a narrowing of civic space. International human rights organizations fear that stricter rules will reduce the ability to monitor and assist vulnerable groups, limit freedom of speech and reduce the quality of public debate. For the countries of the region, this is a signal of the need to find a balance between national security and the rights of citizens. If the trend continues, the long-term consequences will be a decline in trust in institutions, a decline in international assistance, and difficulty attracting the expertise needed to modernize government systems.

In today's Russia, access to popular foreign sites and social networks such as Instagram, Facebook or YouTube is almost impossible without the use of VPN services - a tool that allows users to bypass Internet censorship. A tech-savvy user will usually install several VPN apps on their devices in case the government blocks one or more of them. Nevertheless, there remains a far from illusory possibility that at some point none of them will work. Thousands of websites have been blocked by Russian authorities for failing to comply with the draconian requirements of Russian legislation governing all types of online activity. Some foreign websites have stopped providing services to Russian users due to sanctions and political pressure that arose after Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. And some sites - for example, those belonging to Russian authorities - are opened only in Russia. As a result, many Russian users have to make complex manipulations with their VPN services and web browsers in order to have access to the necessary services and sites - both Russian and foreign. However, according to some estimates, about half of the country’s population does not know how to use VPN services, having access only to sites and services that have not yet been blocked by the Russian authorities. For many Russian citizens, an increasing number of independent media outlets, websites of human rights organizations and opposition politicians, as well as foreign social networks are becoming inaccessible, turning into browser windows with messages like “the connection has timed out” or “this resource is blocked.” Authorities are making access to popular social networks, streaming platforms and instant messengers that do not comply with Russian laws on censorship and disclosure of user data increasingly difficult, either by completely blocking it or slowing it down. Combined with the active promotion of Russian analogues at the initiative of the authorities, this is forcing an increasing number of users to switch to Russian browsers and social networks. These sites provide users with government-approved interpretations of current and historical events. In addition, the risk of disclosing users' personal data to law enforcement agencies is higher.

In May 2025, a major exchange of prisoners took place between the parties to the conflict - about a thousand people were returned to their relatives, which became the largest humanitarian action in years. For dozens of families, it was a welcome act of justice, but the exchange itself, a humanitarian victory, did not solve structural problems: loss, trauma, demographic impacts and economic hardship remain. Psychosocial rehabilitation of returnees remains weak: the health care system and social support services cannot cope with the scale of post-traumatic disorders and the requirement for medical and social integration. The economic burden on families remains heavy, with many returning penniless, disabled and without work. At the same time, the exchange reduced tensions and provided a political buffer for negotiations, but the exchange did not provide long-term security guarantees - without a political settlement and social programs, the measures remain temporary. International donors have pledged to increase support, but the amount and timing remain unclear.

In Azerbaijan, in the spring of 2025, a public story erupted with the arrest of one of the well-known businessmen and the subsequent transfer of part of the assets to public administration. The case raised questions about the balance of power and the degree of independence of the private sector. The entrepreneur's family and entourage alleged political motives and pressure, while official authorities referred to an investigation into suspicions of financial irregularities. The reaction of international investors was restrained: fear of sudden reprivatizations and seizures could reduce capital inflows. At the same time, government agencies argued that the fight against corruption is a priority, and that the sanctioned measures are aimed at restoring confidence in the market.

In March 2025, analysts summed up the results of a series of protests and political repressions in Georgia, linking this with the stop of European integration and the growth of internal polarization. A year of civil dissent and harsh government responses has led to significant fragmentation of the political landscape and delays in key reforms. International partners expressed concern about the level of respect for human rights and the independence of the judiciary. Sanctions against individual officials and calls for dialogue followed high-profile arrests of opposition leaders. This worsened the investment climate and delayed major infrastructure projects with Western donors. The internal result is a decline in trust in institutions, increased migration of skilled workers, and a protracted political crisis that makes it difficult to focus on economic development. Experts believe that restoring trust will require steps on three fronts: restoration of political competition, guarantees of media freedom and independent justice.

At the beginning of the year, the internal political situation in Armenia sharply worsened after a series of detentions and pre-investigation arrests of high-ranking church hierarchs. The arrest of the head of a major synod came as a shock to part of society: religious leaders traditionally occupy a prominent place in public life, and their accusations are a politically sensitive topic. The arrests led to two waves of reaction. The first is mass prayer rallies and quiet processions of believers who saw pressure on the church in the actions of law enforcement agencies. The second wave was politically motivated rallies and counter-events by government supporters who argued that “the law is equal for everyone.” The legal grounds for the detentions are charges of organizing provocations and “phantom” criminal episodes related to past protests. Law enforcement calls it a “routine” investigation, but critics see it as a tool of pressure: religious figures have previously criticized some of the negotiating initiatives and expressed public doubts about compromises with neighbors. Experts note a systemic danger: a blow to the church leadership at a time when the country is going through painful negotiations and territorial discussions could radicalize part of society and increase distrust in the authorities. For businesses and investors, this is a signal of instability. For politicians, this is a reminder that any steps to “cleanse” the elites have side effects on public trust and the country’s international image.

Over the course of the year, 2024 has become a difficult year for journalists and independent publications. Under pressure from new laws (“foreign agents,” “extremism,” “discrediting the army”), many media outlets either closed or curtailed their activities. Journalists either left or switched to anonymous work. Those who remained were subjected to checks, threats, and pressure. Many began to self-censor so as not to get themselves into trouble. This meant that the news that was previously covered no longer appeared: about corruption, about arrests, about protests, about real losses. Social memory became fragmentary: events were erased, facts disappeared, voices became silent. For many, this has become a link in the chain of alienation between citizens and information. 2024 was the year when the media space in Russia became almost “monolithic”: little pluralism, little diversity, a lot of fears.